Washington DC 20 April 2023
MILab: The founder and leader of the US Special Operations Command Red Team, Greg Jannarone, Colonel USAF (Rtd) and (GS-15 strategic planner Rtd) discusses his teams approach to back stopping command plans and policies. He also shares a few brief primers on how to run a Team. This follows a recent article describing the function of Red Teams in the military.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are well suited to RT work because they know all problems are human in origin and solution. They are also the least constrained by the military biases, particularly appeals to tradition and authority biases. After the bin Laden Raid SOF were turned into heroes in the popular imagination. The reality is they have always been the red-headed step children in the US military, primarily because they are not associated with “decisive major conventional military operations” that the Pentagon continues to tell itself is what warfare is all about, despite history proving it is the exception not the rule. SOF indeed has a role in major conventional warfare, a growing one, but culturally, SOF has been and will likely always be the outsider at Pentagon parties.
—MILab1
CONFRONTING AMBIGUITY AND SURPRISE:
RED TEAMING IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) WICKED PROBLEMS
Red teaming, in the most basic sense, is critiquing, challenging, and providing alternate perspectives, assessments, or forecasts on adversary behavior, future challenges or threats, and military planning processes and content. It’s a skeptical, analytical, and often contrarian body of methods and techniques. Practitioners are obsessively curious by nature and predisposed to consider alternatives to consensus views, problem framing, analytical approaches, and plans. The goal is to improve organizational and operational preparedness by avoiding or mitigating surprise, and illuminating cross-cultural perspectives and values of adversaries and others. Doctrinal and commercial definitions of red teaming may not facilitate understanding, and won’t be offered.
Irregular warfare (IW) can be considered a large set of wicked problems. The two terms have common elements that include open-ended definitions, ambiguity (i.e., the meaning or intention of communication or behavior is unclear, as may be the perpetrator), surprise, and changing content and dynamics. As initially observed conditions of an IW phenomenon – or a wicked problem – change, analyses, and observers’ comprehension become increasingly difficult. In fact, there is typically no preordained or forecasted end state. This causes estimates of a situation, inferring actor intent, and characterizing the type and degree of threat or risk to be difficult; thus, of minimal aid to typical forms of military, political, diplomatic, law enforcement or other decision-making on countering or responding.
A major and obvious advantage for an aggressive nation-state or nonstate actor is a surprise. It can be the result of political posturing, intelligence services activities, military deception, diversions, response conditioning, or more simply, of ambiguity consciously pursued. At the extreme, surprise can be the major factor in rendering ineffective the defensive posture and options of the target country or other actor. In the types of strategic competition that compel us today, a determined adversary or coalition of competitors is using less obvious, incremental, and corrosive means and behaviors to gain advantages and dilute responses. Attribution is often difficult due to the use of 3rd parties, indirect delivery, and disinformation. Even when attributed correctly, dilemmas arise as to the nature, timing, and rigor of a response—assuming the perpetrator has not already attained the planned or desired objective. Arriving at the best possible and improving understanding of what, who, and why is the basis for options development for decision-makers. Red teaming is a valuable toolkit for this need.
In every bureaucracy—civilian, military, intelligence, corporate, academic, news, and social media—very human mental obstacles exist, and persist, to understanding the values, interests, motives and behavioral drivers of people or groups “not like us.” Mirror imaging (we would do it this way if we were they), confirmation bias (I know what I know, and my belief is accurate), group think, assumptions ( especially about ‘rationality’) and procedural and conceptual rigidity, act as narrowing forces on divergent or alternative thinking, problem framing—a KEY issue with wicked problems— and information search and vetting. Specifically selected, trained, experienced, and independently operating red teams are designed and focused on confronting these mental obstacles, and can usually offer culturally attuned insights on the who and why of IW activity phenomena.
Any red team leader and members expect a cold greeting, dubious attitudes, and hesitant cooperation or collaboration. In the military, staff and commanders have often regarded red teams as nonexpert interlopers who are critical of the staff’s analysis, planning, intelligence conclusions, and approach to a problem or series of problems. To a degree, they are correct; the red team begins by a critical assessment of what has been done, not done, assumptions made, analyses performed, and conclusions reached. Then it addresses the cultural context of the known or likely actors, baselining the values held (of ethnic, religious, political, linguistic and historical origins). What do those values, and cultural norms, reveal as to likely enduring interests, the range of acceptable behaviors, and potential partnerships or proxy relationships?
Problem framing in IW and for wicked problems, is often a stumbling block for staff intelligence, plans and operations. How much or how wide in scope should the context be, and how many physical, cognitive, and digital dimensions of power, statecraft, geography and time should be included? It resonates with operational design thinking, and staffs that are so trained are much less resistant to red team involvement. One approach is to first treat a perplexing IW phenomenon as unique and independent of a larger scheme or campaign. More information and intelligence and even outside cultural or topical experts may be needed. If the red team’s techniques such as Devil’s Advocacy, Team A-Team B, analysis of competing hypotheses, are insightful, the phenomenon may then be considered within a series of others to discover or infer linkages to actors, methods and motives. This example is only suggestive, as there are dozens of red team techniques that apply to a range of issues, problems, estimates, panning challenges, and forecasts.
Wicked problems are complex, mutating with time, and overlapping with other wicked problems. What is common with IW phenomena? Ambiguity is inherent, changing conditions cause content and dynamics to change, and attribution is difficult or often impossible. This can cause surprise. But IW phenomena are generated and executed by people, and if the cultural and other contexts are studied, reasonable inferences and insights about the correlation with other phenomena are possible, if not always causality. There are only about a dozen truly distinct human behaviors, emanating from biological and cognitive drivers. The forms and intensities of course vary greatly, but as wicked as any given phenomenon appears, human group behavior is purposeful. Complex, varied, nonlinear, and discontinuous, yes; but not chaotic.
Red teams can be valuable partners with staff and for decision-makers and are more useful as the problems become more complex. Using deep analysis, assumptions critiques, cultural knowledge, illuminating cognitive biases, and design-inspired problem framing, they need only withholding of judgment and suspension of disbelief to help.
August G. Jannarone, Col, USAF, Ret.
December, 2022
WHAT, WHY, HOW, WHO of Red Teaming
WHAT: Red teaming is a structured, iterative process employing trained and practiced members. It provides commanders an independent, disinterested capability to challenge assumptions, plans, concepts, and organizational biases, in the context of operational environments, and from partners' and adversaries' perspectives.
WHY: (1) Assist the command and its forces to avoid or mitigate negative SURPRISE, from strategy, technology, geopolitics, and the human and cognitive domains.
(2) Explore impactful future scenarios that are possible, plausible, feasible, and relevant to command missions and functions.Illuminate likely actors and probable behaviors that support, challenge or threaten national interests and command forces.
(3) Support and improve plans and planning through critical analysis and interactive challenge or contrarian techniques.
HOW: (1) Identify and illuminate institutional biases, staff or functional area groupthink, planning gaps or vulnerabilities, questionable assumptions, and common cognitive biases.
(2) In collaboration with staff and external SMEs, identify evolving challenges, threats, and opportunities; model or wargame as feasible and necessary.
(3) Perform strategy-to-task functional decomposition, WHAT IF? and pre-mortem analyses, and cross-cultural values assessments.
(4) Direct questioning and alternatives support to operational planning teams, as requested or directed, at key phase points.
(5) Critical thinking, behavioral influences assessment, and alternative analysis instructional support, as requested or tasked.
WHO: Approximately 8 to 10 team members, from most major staff functions: including 0-4 to 0-5 staff officers from all 4 Services; GS 11-14; selected, low-density skills contractors, on a partial task basis.
(A.G. Jannarone, September, 2022)
Axiological or VALUES targeting - comparison
Deterrence and compellence are based on targeting the values of the opponent. This means putting at risk, degrading, or severely damaging their core physical, virtual, economic, and reputational elements. Seek to target UPSTREAM or HIGHER on the value hierarchy, once you have established theirs.
After establishing the opponent’s values, RANK ORDER them from most down to least important or consequential. Number them from 1 through the last...start each targeting iteration with no more than 10 values (facilities, objects, people, forces, ideas, etc.). Each value is considered in terms of what it means for the opponent’s capabilities, or opportunities .
Construct a second rank ordering of the SAME VALUES, in descending order of VULNERABILITY as a TARGET, Base the vulnerability ordering on a basic factors system such as CARVER or SWOT. Number them from 1 (most vulnerable) to the last.
Compare the two lists. The numbers can be used (or ignored) by adding the two numbers for each value...one number from each ordering list... with the LOWEST numerical totals being the better value-vulnerability choices for target development and planning purposes.
Now question what you have discovered. Which higher value targets are vulnerable to being affected by your current capabilities, intelligence, resources, time, reach, weapons and/or words, and access? Decide which are to be attacked sooner and which later, and which ones attacked only when additional capability becomes available to you.
(A.G. Jannarone, September, 2022)
Warning on Forecasting
A single, substantive caution when writing on, advocating for, speaking on or doing red teaming (which is really alternative critical analysis, followed by assessment, finishing with a behavioral forecast). If a behavioral forecast is requested by and/or tolerated by the senior above a red team and/or the intelligence function.
CAUTION: if the truth or the likely future reality, is likely to be unpalatable to the senior/organizational leadership, then alternative assessments must be "digestible"and each one should have a 4 minute elevator speech.
I have seen RT’s get cut off, berated by flags, and innumerable G2/J2 leaders, and asked to leave the briefing site immediately. Egos are prominent when the truth or likely reality is unpleasant or threatening news.
WHAT A RED CELL DOES NOT DO is forecast....beyond the tactical and operational situation presented.
WHY: a good/honest/functionally grounded red cell consists of highly qualified operators. A FORECAST requires different, and usually unique skills, and accommodating teamwork, even within a well trained/educated/practiced and unified red team.
WHY?? Because a forecast of human/organizational behavior is the most speculative of all the (at least partially) speculative approaches and products of a serious red team.
A FORECAST should consider;
past actor behaviors in like/similar/related situations of decision making and/or actions;
the cultural context as it exists for the actor and for those that may be acted UPON: (the reasonable range of important outcomes that are Possible, Plausible, and Feasible (PPF....a KEY issue);
the major or likely impacts and consequences of each future scenario or outcome.
WHY??? To provide the organizational planners with a basis for their planning to avoid, prevent, counter or allow each outcome that matters to the senior people
FORECASTING should include the rationally and logically PPF scenarios or outcomes that are "wild cards" or statistical outliers or Black Swans.
The customer must decide which of the several forecasts are necessary to plan or prepare for and to what degree.
(A.G. Jannarone, April, 2023)
MILab had the privilege of serving on Col Jannarone’s Red Team.