IRAN - AFTERMATH
No Regime Change by US
Washington DC 24 June 2025
The key findings of MIL’s report from 19 June - stand. To reiterate
BLUF:
There will be no regime change by any external power in IRN.2
The United States will not invade Iran.
This is not Iraq or Afghanistan or Vietnam.
This was a heavy, but limited, air strike against a target-set only the US could touch.
We still do not know to what extent it was effective. That intelligence will take weeks. Early indications are generally positive. Claims of “total obliteration” are cosmetic and rhetorical with no basis in fact.3
The president took this action based on a few key factors:
Compared to just a few weeks ago, there was a negligible threat to US forces flying deep into IRN.
ISR had removed the bulk of the Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) threat.
ISR had decapitated leadership in all of IRNs proxies and IRGC forces - down to at least the first 2-3 rungs in the hierarchy, and in some cases much further down the chain of command.
In Jan 2020, a major strategic lesson was learned when the US struck the IRGC leader and national hero, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, as he was moving around Iraq.
That assassination broke a number of taboos with respect to US military operational norms.
Most importantly, it went strategically unanswered.
America discovered Iran had an unexpected reluctance to risk escalation by the kinds of retaliation expected - namely shutting down the Strait of Hormuz and mass terror attacks around the world.
In Jan 2023 while advocating striking Iran, I asked “what will be their response?” and answered “Silence. The last thing they want is a general war. They cannot afford a general war and they would overwhelmingly suffer as a result.” That assessment has been proven accurate by recent events.
All of these factors taken together pointed to a very low risk - high pay off result.
Partisan politics played a role
With tanking approval ratings, an embarrassing public spilt with his top donor, Elon Musk (who alleged on twitter the President is a pedophile), an unintimidating military parade, unprecedented nation-wide protests (far more widespread and well attended than Vietnam protests4), and growing fractures in his base over foreign interventions; President Trump, assessed the risk was worth it if it would make him look like a decisive war leader and a strategic genius who delivered a major victory.5
Post-bombing BLUF - Known Knowns
The attack was a stunning success from the perspective of initial operational metrics - no casualties, achievement of strategic and operational surprise, superb deception, good OPSEC. The USG used the oft repeated “2 weeks” delay statements commonly heard in the White House to its advantage to secure surprise.
MIL accurately assessed the attack would happen Saturday because the Iranians did not announce their attendance at the pre-arranged Sunday meeting. Had IRN been smart, it would have announced it would attend the pre-planned meeting, ruining US plans and operational surprise. Saddam Hussein played America for years with this tactic. IRN was too arrogant or stressed to engage in this delay tactic.
There was no time to waste due to concern that HEU might be transshipped away from the sites (see below).6
Nevertheless, if all else failed, destroying the centrifuges themselves is still of huge significance because no further enrichment can take place and centrifuges are not cheap or easy to acquire or put into production.7
IRN’s warfighting capabilities and warmaking capacity have been severely degraded by ISR. The backs of its proxies have been broken. IRN is now largely defenseless against air strikes. Accordingly, its ability to mount offensive operations in the war with ISR is fast approaching a breaking point.
IRN is high on propaganda and outlandish threats. It’s all empty posturing. All of the cataclysmic ‘end of the world’ garbage they are spewing is a clear sign of their desperation. At this point it is pathetic.
IRNs appears to have only two ‘cards’ left to play. Terrorism and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. However, neither of these are likely to happen.
IRNs ability to mount terror operations inside ISR or the west are now dependent on whatever pre-positioned assets are waiting for the order.
However, the order may not come, so as to avoid giving its enemies cause to escalate further.
Moreover, Israeli intelligence has so effectively penetrated the entire IRN ecosystem of violence that enormous friction now blankets all their ‘options’.
The Strait of Hormuz will be addressed below in detail because it is the most strategic option.
The Axis of Authoritarianism took yet another heavy hit. IRN’s ‘allies’ effectively silent.
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) - early reports
Was it effective? BDA is pending. It is always never as good as hoped. BDA is difficult in this context because the targets are 200ft+ under the ground. Pictures merely show holes in the ground. MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) or HUMINT (Human Intelligence) will be critical.
A trusted MIL source has estimated the following:
Fordow - “sat photos show debris very consistent with thermobaric explosions in tunnel [main halls (2) likely breaches and functionally destroyed]”
“Natanz (2 x GBU-57) looks successful: main underground hall appears to have collapsed”
“US may have hit “Pickaxe Mountain” (Mt Kolang Gaz-La) by Natanz where Iran was building yet another underground enrichment site”
“Someone hit Iran Navy in Bandar Abbas (probably US)”
“ISR destroyed Arak Heavy Water reactor (non-functional), to be used to produce plutonium”
Known unknowns:
There has been speculation that IRN had trucks at these sites moving “enriched uranium”. MIL’s source is vague yet a little promising on this score:
“Location of Iran’s ~400kg of 60% HEU unknown: ISL says it has “interesting intel” on it”
What does that mean? There is no world in which these sites were not watched with an unblinking eye. Therefore, if materials were moved, there will be a record. Scattering would be smart, but security suggests only a handful of alternative storage sites could likely be trusted. Given the priority of these targets, it is likely sufficient surveillance assets were allocated to track dispersal.
In short, this issue is far from over. As noted above, loss of the centrifuges themselves is critically important.
How will the regime react if the Supreme Leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, is killed?
How will the people of Iran react if the Supreme Leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, is killed?
The ONLY source of regime change is internal. However, that threat is the ONLY one the regime can control. Accordingly, it is the one for which they are best prepared.
Unknown unknowns
Unknown unknowns are unknown at this time. [Couldn’t resist, sorry].
Iranian COAs (Courses of Action)
Concede defeat. Acknowledge that a theocratic regime built on global terror in alliance with the Axis of Authoritarianism has been an abject failure. Have a ‘glasnost and perestroika’ moment. Do a deal with America to lift sanctions in exchange for a commitment to renounce violence in all its forms, renounce nuclear ambitions, and join the international community as a peaceful and productive member. Sell oil openly on the international market. Offer a Trump-Tower Tehran deal. Seek additional funds from America to rapidly rebuild. America is famous for loans and support to vanquished foes (it’s all basically a buy-American govt subsidy to domestic industry). Write a new social contract with the people of IRN - to promote freedom of expression and entrepreneurialism.
This actually would work but it is never going to happen because it is antithetical to the regime and is western wishful thinking.
If a successful revolution takes place resulting in some form of stability, the above plan would be a smart play for a new government.
Really cynical (hey it’s the Iranian regime). Superficially, do all of the above good stuff while rebuilding a terror machine and preparing for revenge.
Indirect warfare - withdraw and rebuild.
This is the “Saddam post 1991 strategy” (which worked until 2003)
Safe in the knowledge no one will invade the homeland
Buy time -
Declare no further actions against the US and/or ISR
Drag out negotiations
Go quiet on the US and just concentrate on ISR and domestic threats. Alternatively, go quiet on both enemies.
If it pursues this path, the US cannot escalate - denying ISR additional force multipliers - for example B-52s attacking at will in a multi-week campaign to silence all remaining IRN threats.
Crack down at home against any domestic opportunists seeking to take advantage of ‘once in a lifetime’ regime weakness, chaos and confusion.
Quietly rebuild to return to the regimes only known way of life - future terrorist and related operations.
Reconstitute the nuclear program and drive as hard and fast to a weapon as possible. (Extremely hard to do now as to be next to unrealistic - but that does not mean the regime understands this or accepts it).
Continue Direct Warfare
Continue the fight against ISR
Escalate, forcing the US to get more involved, hoping the resulting fissures in US domestic politics causes Trump to TACO.
There are only 2 major cards to be played here: Terror and the Strait.
The next to last card - Terrorism
Conduct whatever terror operations are possible
For just one example, did Iran ever have the cruise missile in a shipping container weapon or was that just more propaganda? Something like that could get attention given the USN has surged 2 Carrier Strike Groups (CARL VINSON & NIMITZ) into the region with GERALD R. FORD sailing for the European theatre. US CSGs should be on maximum alert but one of these might get off a lucky shot given the surprise factor
Sleeper cells in the US. I’ve heard these stories for years. Im skeptical. Yes assassins have attempted to kill US officials on US soil. But these were not sleepers.8
Post 9/11, security arrangements are tiresome with a lot of theater, but some complications have been created to mounting a major attack compared to the open door pre-9/11 context.
Additionally, with ISL spies seeded throughout the terror ecosystem and most of the key leaders dead, just assuming sleeper cells will function effectively is ill advised (if they exist).
If they are here, what might they do? Not an exhaustive list but the kind of things DHS should be thinking creatively about.
Be selfish, ignore the homeland and fully integrate into US society to keep from getting killed… or
Washington Sniper Scenario. 5 x 2 man teams in DC, NYC, LA, Chicago, and Huston. The media would go into spasms, like they did last time. The US would grind to a halt overnight. Domestic partisan division would go berserk resulting in self-defeating fights.
This would be exacerbated by the new practice of “federal agents” wearing masks and not showing IDs. Not only is that unconstitutional, its is an open door for terrorists and criminals to exploit.
Pre-positioned explosive drones. Ukraine was the first mover on this strategy - remotely blowing up at least 1/3rd of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. However, ISR itself had the same idea, given they executed a similar mission inside Iran weeks later. Is it unreasonable to think the diabolical IRGC missed the signals and has not done some drone pre-positioning on ships or land?
From the Ukraine moment onwards, I noted US bombers or fighters sitting on a runway in Guam or Diego Garcia was a very bad idea. We are not making B-52s or B-1s any more and B-21s (~$700m) and F-35s (~$100m) are exquisitely expensive. The US has not lost any manned aircraft to combat since 1999, when a U.S. Air Force F-16CG was shot down by a Serbian SA-3 surface-to-air missile during Operation Allied Force over Kosov. Losing just a few, while they could be replaced, would be an unprecedented national humiliation.
Now imagine if IRN also had the pre-positioned drone idea. Imagine also that it does have sleeper cells in the US. How well monitored are all trucks within a few miles of golf courses used by the President?
The first assassination attempt in Butler PA showed how abysmally underprepared the USSS was for an assassination attempt.
They have an anti drone capability at the White House but I bet it’s limited to 1-2 drones and is not on 24/7 alert.
I further bet it is not mobile and is not in place at golf courses frequented by the President on a sufficient scale to stop a swam of 30 drones each armed with plastic explosive.
A successful attack of this kind would send the US into a severe crisis.
However, the net result for IRN would be catastrophic. So that level of provocation is unlikely. From Soleimani on wards, they have consistently chosen to withdraw and bide their time. A strike on Trump like this is out of character. Except for 2 scenarios.
1. They want to try and draw the US into a ground intervention. However, they could not control how that unfolds among their people. The regime could as easily get caught in a quagmire as the US.
2. Nero decree - if they are going under they may attempt revenge regardless of cost.
Iran allies
Short term, Russia and China are both losers. North Korea, a winner. Long term, I have some ideas about what they might try and achieve WRT to the US.
Russia depends on Iranian drones for its war in Ukraine. North Korea will be a winner of the attack on Iran as Russia deepens their reliance on Kim’s army and factories. Kim’s missile technology is already reported to have improved.
China is dependent on sanction-busting cheap oil that comes through the Strait of Hormuz. Their calculus is therefore more complex. Xi is rumored to be under pressure in the politburo for being too aggressive and turning the world against China. Some reports I have seen suggest he is facing significant sanction. These reports have strong provenance but I am taking them cautiously. If true, China’s response maybe muted.
Chinas need for oil will also impact the support and advice it gives the regime regarding its future strategy. See below.
The Last Card in the Deck - The Strait of Hormuz
Attack the Strait to disrupt the global economy and make Trump look weak
Right now, the remaining immediate key strategic risk is the free flow of trade in the Strait of Hormuz. However, IRN may have been so weakened as to be unable to generate sufficient mass to meaningfully interdict or destroy targets covered by that objective. After suffering weeks of excruciating losses imposed by ISR across command and control, weapons systems, communications, supply lines and weapons manufacturing facilities, I judge with moderately high confidence that IRN is almost certainly not in a position to respond at sufficient scale to be militarily effective.
I previously wrote that IRGC counter-maritime trade assets should be destroyed. As will be shown, reporting is mixed as to whether this has happened at any scale. Those IRGC forces are a key threat and should have been attacked during the nuclear site raids to prevent a counter-strike on shipping. However, there is an additional break on IRNs use of economic warfare which just got a big boost from Trump:
China. President Trump this morning hinted he will lift sanctions on China’s purchase of Iranian oil. This is remarkably smart. It will enhance pressures on Tehran to avoid attacking shipping. Remember that China’s oil purchases, including from IRN, all pass the Strait. Chine does not brook gamesmanship with its energy supplies.
Background:
In January 2023, I wrote that Iran is weak and should be attacked in response to Iranian proxy war making around the region. The argument was “there is little point playing patty-cake with proxies” and that “either we allow ourselves to be bedeviled by a thousands cuts or we turn our attention to the head of the snake and impose unmanageable burdens on the things it cherishes the most.” See
At that time, I recommended the target set should be the assets and capabilities that pose a threat to the strait and then, if there was push back to bomb the enrichment sites.
The following day 1 target set should be destroyed in a synchronized attack. It should be done at night to minimize casualties.
All IRGC fast boats and bases they use to harass shipping in the Strait and supply the Houthis
MV's Behshad & Saviz (Iranian spy ships)
C2 nodes that service the coast
Coastal missile batteries
Coastal mine storage
Surface surveillance radars
What will be their response?
Silence. The last thing they want is a general war. They cannot afford a general war and they would overwhelmingly suffer as a result. The target set above is a stronger response than the usual rules of the proportionate retaliatory game. By design. It is limited, removes assets we need removed anyway, and imposes the escalatory burden on Iran. They know as well as well do that if they escalate our next steps would be devastating. The day 2 target set would involve all their key war making capabilities, including nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Our objective is to destroy war making capacity and set a new, much lower threshold, to deter any future hybrid warfare tactics.
In last week’s assessment, where I accurately anticipated the timing, target set and weapons used in the attack, I wrote “the US should simultaneously eliminate all Iranian maritime assets used to threaten the Strait of Hormuz.”
News reporting over the past 72 hours has mostly focused on the nuclear targets. Consequently, there is only very patchy and unreliable sourcing on the IRGC small boat and mine threat. For example, Kurdistan24.net reports some ships, including at least one of the spy ships have been hit in Bandar Abbas, the port from which IRGC and navy ships operate. Similar reports were made in The Jerusalem Post, which added the transshipment point for ballistic missiles being set to the Houthis was destroyed.
ISR has shown excellent operational intelligence and while I cannot confirm it, my baseline assumption is they have thought this through and have taken measures to deny the IRGC opportunities to counter strike. Most importantly, China will now play a big role and they will be totally against Tehran taking any action in the Strait.
The price of oil reflects these factors - dropping since the initial spike
Oil $ Immediately after the attack
Brent crude rose 3.3% to $79.60 a barrel
WTI crude rose 3.1% to $76.16 a barrel
At time of writing
Brent crude: $71.68/barrel (down 7.23% from the previous day)
WTI crude: $67.48/barrel (down 8.85% from the previous day)
Strategic Net Assessment
The West continues its march to victory in the global hybrid war.
The Israel - Iran war is a key front in the global hybrid war. Events in this theatre will have impacts in Ukraine and to the threat against South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.
The Axis of Authoritarianism has been substantially and measurably weakened by the success of ISRs war against IRN (a second tier Axis member). Iran’s ‘allies’, Russia and China have been largely mute. Russia has lost a desperately needed arms supplier and China’s need for IRN oil is a check on IRNs last remaining ‘card’ - closing the Strait of Hormuz.
The Axis, already weakened by Russia’s disastrous and failing war in Ukraine has been dealt a serious blow.
For example, Russia has lost most of its Black Sea fleet to a country with no navy and at least 30% + of its strategic bombers to some Chinese made toys.
The bombers were a key component of Russias nuclear triad. Consequently, Russia’s nuclear warfighting capabilities have been severely degraded by Ukraine’s ingenious drone attack.
The Iranian regime is now in a desperate position. It is in a major war with ISR and must decide whether it wants to add the US to that already daunting uphill challenge. If IRN does not seriously counter attack, America will be forced into the growing “one and done” narrative. For IRN, this would be the preferable outcome.
IRN is rapidly losing the war against one enemy - ISR. It cannot afford to add a second enemy - especially not a superpower.
Stealth is no longer needed to penetrate IRN airspace, leaving the country’s military targets wide open to B-52 and B-1 heavy bomber missions against any target, at will, for an unlimited duration. The same applies for US fighter-bombers stationed in the region.
Historical parallel: Hitler unnecessarily declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor. Will IRN make a similar mistake?
Regime stability
There will be no regime change imposed by any external power.
Any regime change will be from within. The regime will be prepared for this possibility
Wild Card
ISR and the US are able to kill the Supreme Leader of Iran. So far they have avoided taking that action. It is the ultimate escalation and unneeded given how well operations have been progressing. Still it is an option that may be exercised in the future.
The Iranians are reporting they have taken appropriate succession measures should he be killed.
Given the diverse religious and ethnic mix in IRN, killing the dictator has high potential for unintended consequences. A worst case scenario would be a Lebanon style civil war. This is unlikely, in so far as IRN does not have a bunch of competing powers all running proxies inside IRN against one another as was the case in Lebanon. A more likely scenario would be replacement by a military figure or a new cleric. Some commentary is concerned a replacement runs the risk of being worse and so it is better to stay with the devil you know. Except, have you seen this devil? How much worse could the next one get? On the contrary, the laws of probability, if nothing else, suggest the destabilization that would follow might be the opening internal groups need. One thing is certain. It wont be easy, clean or fast, resulting in a Jeffersonian democracy. It will be ugly, bloody, and painful. But there is a chance it might be a little better.
IRNs best option
Choose the ‘glasnost and perestroika’ option. It would end the conflict, preserve the regime’s control, and infuse it with funds. However, it's simply too counter cultural and pregnant with western wishful thinking.
My analysis has been consistently prescient and accurate. It is also offered free because I think people can benefit reading analysis normally shared in government at the highest levels. If you find my work useful, you can pledge a paid subscription. If you would just like to acknowledge an individual posts or not get caught up in a subscription please “buy me a beer!”
Thank you to everyone who has pledged paid subscriptions and shouted me a beer! It’s really appreciated.
Chronological Order of Assessments
Related
Iran and Israel in geostrategic context with the rest of the world’s conflicts
Terminology:
IRN - Iran
ISR - Israel
IRGC - Iranian Revolution Guard Corps or Quds force which is separate from the armed forces and far more important/capable.
Shia Persians being occupied by Jews, Sunni Arabs or Christians is a non-starter for all concerned. Also of note, Persians make up only about 1/2 the population, the rest is a mixture of ethnicities and religions. IRN has a lot of internal tensions as explained in the first assessment.
If anything less than “total obliteration” this irresponsible statement will become a major liability. On you get into high stakes military operations you can't run things like a reality tv show. You can't spin at this level.
The "No Kings" protests appear unprecedented in several ways:
Scale: At 4-6 million participants, they exceeded the Vietnam era's peak of 3 million
Geographic Spread: Protests occurred "in every state"
Coordination: Unlike Vietnam protests that built over years, these were organized as a single coordinated day of action
Population Percentage: Representing 1-2% of the total U.S. population in a single day
However, it's worth noting that Vietnam War protests sustained over many years (1964-1973) while the No Kings protests represent a single day's mobilization.
Anything short of this could go the other way with tough results given the maga split over Trump's promise not to get into wars.
MIL did not want to say this publicly for obvious reasons.
Manufacturing Complexity
Precision Engineering Requirements: Gas centrifuges operate at extremely high speeds (50,000-70,000 RPM) and must maintain perfect balance. The rotors require materials with exceptional strength-to-weight ratios, typically specialized carbon fiber or maraging steel. Manufacturing these components demands precision machining capabilities that few facilities possess.
Material Constraints: The most critical component - maraging steel or advanced carbon fiber composites - are subject to strict international export controls. These materials have very specific metallurgical properties and require specialized production techniques that can't be easily improvised.
Technical Expertise
Specialized Knowledge: Centrifuge design involves complex fluid dynamics, materials science, and precision engineering. The institutional knowledge of how to balance rotors, design optimal gas flow patterns, and prevent catastrophic failures takes years to develop and can be lost when facilities are destroyed.
Cascade Design: Beyond individual centrifuges, designing efficient cascade systems (how centrifuges are connected in series and parallel) requires deep understanding of isotope separation physics and process optimization.
Infrastructure Dependencies
Clean Room Manufacturing: Centrifuge production requires ultra-clean manufacturing environments to prevent contamination that could cause imbalances and failures. These facilities are expensive and time-intensive to establish.
Quality Control Systems: Each centrifuge must undergo extensive testing and balancing. The specialized equipment for this testing is itself controlled technology.
Supply Chain Integration: Modern centrifuge programs depend on hundreds of specialized components from precision bearings to vacuum pumps, magnetic suspension systems, and specialized gaskets - all requiring coordinated supply chains.
Time and Scale Factors
Development Timeline: Even with existing knowledge, rebuilding a centrifuge program typically takes 3-5 years minimum. Iran's program took over a decade to mature, and that was with some foreign assistance.
Industrial Scale: Weapons-grade enrichment requires thousands of centrifuges operating in coordinated cascades. Scaling from laboratory prototypes to industrial production presents enormous logistical challenges.
The combination of these factors means that while reconstitution is theoretically possible, it represents a massive undertaking requiring sustained political commitment, significant financial resources, specialized expertise, and several years of development time - making it a substantial deterrent even if not permanently prohibitive.
Known terror plots in the US
2011 Saudi Ambassador Plot:
An Iranian-American from Corpus Christi, Texas, approached a DEA informant seeking the help of a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador.
John Bolton - Mike Pompeo Plot
Beginning in October 2021, Shahram Poursafi, aka Mehdi Rezayi, 45, of Tehran, Iran, offered to pay contacts in the U.S. up to $300,000 to arrange the murder of former National Security Advisor John Bolton, in retaliation for the January 2020 death of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Soleimani
Poursafi allegedly used encrypted messaging apps and alluded to a $1 million offer for a future "job." Pompeo was the second target.
These cases illustrate the assassination team model rather than sleeper cells:
External Operator: Poursafi operated from Tehran, not as an embedded asset
Recruitment Approach: tried to pay $300,000 to individuals in the U.S. to carry out the assassination seeking to hire local operatives rather than activating pre-positioned cells
IRGC Direction: Direct involvement of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
These cases demonstrate Iran's consistent operational pattern: external direction, financial inducement of local assets, and specific mission-driven recruitment rather than maintaining long-term sleeper cells.
Perhaps .. just perhaps.. they don’t want to behave like this and target civilians
Excellent